wasn't normal or human, because humans are rational, intelligent beings, and children are often portrayed as innocents, incapable of such murderous actions. Evil was, therefore, consigned to illness or madness; this evil was aberrant, not part of what is normal.
This last observation raises the question of how any culture or society defines "normal." It is a relative term and a bit of a chameleon; that is, its meaning is presumed from the context in which it is used. What is presumed normal in Sydney's Bondi Beach, known for its topless bathing, is not considered normal in Dubai. Whereas cultural practices have a huge impact on what is considered normal, evil is seen to be abnormal, that is, something that other people do. Hilary Brand in her paper "Whatever Happened to Sin?" wrote:
Evil is something done by "the other": terrorists, murderers, Nazis, or those in political or commercial power. Evil's prevalence as a term rather than "sin" arguably indicates a tendency to divert responsibility for the world's wrongs away from ordinary individuals, and locate it in less personal organisations and systems. (2016, 248) .
Hannah Arendt in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem writes of Eichmann: "Half a dozen psychiatrists had certified him as 'normal'-more normal, at any rate, than I am after having examined him!" one of them was said to have exclaimed (1963/2006, 25-26) . Another wrote that Eichmann's psychological outlook, his attitude toward his wife and children, mother and father, brothers and sisters, and friends was "not only normal but most desirable" (25) (26) .
These quotes reflect different but converging devices by which Eichmann was able to displace the responsibility from himself. On one hand the perception of what is normal is sublimated to the environment in which he existed. To his family, he is a normal, even exemplary father and husband. To his employer, his nation, the Third Reich, he is a normal, even exemplary public servant. But this alone is not enough. As is evidenced in his response to the trial where he admitted feeling guilt before God, Eichmann was not able to fully erase his sense of right and wrong, so the matter of exoneration from personal culpability needed a further mechanism. For Eichmann, that further mechanism was to elevate his duty to his country above his duty to himself, or to the Jewish people, or to any of the people who needed to be eradicated for the "higher purposes" of the Third Reich.
An observer of Eichmann's 1961 trial, Arendt notes that the trial judges could not believe that one of the principal architects of the Holocaust was so normal:
…because they were too good, and perhaps conscious of the very foundation of their profession, to admit that an average, "normal" person, neither feeble-minded nor indoctrinated nor cynical, could be perfectly incapable of telling right from wrong. The judges concluded from the occasional lies of Eichmann that he was a liar. (Arendt 1963 (Arendt /2006 For Arendt, it was impossible to make sense of Eichmann's crimes in terms of wicked intentions, character defects, or duress (26). Arendt concluded that Eichmann was not a monster (287) .
Eichmann was neither a hater of the Jewish people nor was he a murderous fanatic prior to the rise of Hitler's Germany. In this sense Eichmann cannot be compared with common criminals; he was a law-abiding citizen. Eichmann was primarily a follower and a careerist. It was for these reasons he became involved with the Nazi regime, and once involved he internalized and accepted the Nazi ideology without question. Eichmann elevated the primary validity of his government's right to define good and evil over any other claims to allegiance that might arise from individual responsibility, and was committed, above all, to performing his professional duties to the best of his abilities. In his own mind Eichmann was an instrument, and although he knew his actions sent millions of Jews to the gas chambers, he never accepted that he was personally responsible for their deaths or the human suffering. It is in this sense that the thought structures Eichmann adopted enabled him to function, in his own estimation, as a normal, sane, even good person.
Eichmann justified his work by conferring upon an external body the right to be an authentication of what is normal and right. Within the context of the principles of the Third Reich, having accepted its right to define what was good, Eichmann could be deemed virtuous and responsible, faithful and good. He was able to be a kind and loving father and husband with no disparity between this and his slaughter of millions of families. By these two devices-the abrogation of personal moral responsibility to the larger context and the submersion of his own morality into the myopia of being a faithful and loyal servant-Eichmann could function without the tensions of cognitive dissonance that would be expected in a person trying to hold together such mutually contradictory personas, the loving family man and the merciless destroyer of life and community.
Eichmann's attitude did not occur in a vacuum. In his book Hitler's Willing Executioners, Daniel Goldhagen explores the mindset of ordinary Germans in the World War II era-why they voted Hitler into power in 1933 and why they complied with the Nazis' policy of mass murder of the Jewish people. Goldhagen argues that hatred of the Jewish people had been part of the German psyche for centuries (1997, 49) .
It is intriguing that two features of Eichmann's defense, which was also his personal validation, have their genesis in German ecclesiastical history and particularly in the hero of German reformation, Martin Luther. The first part, the justifiable role of the executioner, is clearly espoused by Luther. He strongly supported the state's use of the death penalty as a means of exercising social control: "Let no one imagine that the world can be governed without the shedding of blood" (Luther 1971, 248) . Luther argued that God appointed civil authorities, to serve either as soldiers, hangmen, or bureaucrats, within their Christian duty: "Therefore the sword is God's rod and vengeance for it" (2013, 451). The death penalty operated to protect society from harm, but it also functioned as a divine repudiation of evil. Because the criminal not only endangered the social order but also disobeyed the laws of God, execution served to reassert the power of God over evil in this world (451).
The active destruction of the Jewish people was also justified in Luther's writings. In 1543 he published an essay "On the Jews and Their Lies," launching a vicious attack on the Jewish people and what he considered the false boasts of the Jews on their ancestry. The Nazis often quoted from this paper as justification for what they were perpetrating against the Jews. Throughout this treatise, Luther decried the Jewish people, claiming they were "an idle and lazy people, such a useless, evil, pernicious people, such blasphemous enemies of God" (1971, 137) . He stressed the commonly held belief that because Jews made their livelihood through usury, they were able to "steal and rob from others: get rich on our sweat and blood, while we remain poor and they suck the marrow from our bones" (276). Luther told Christians to "set fire to their synagogues or schools and to bury and cover with dirt whatever will not burn" (268). He recommended that "their houses also be razed and destroyed" (269). Further, he advised that "all their prayer books and Talmudic writings, in which such idolatry, lies, cursing, and blasphemy are taught, be taken from them" (269). He declared that "rabbis be forbidden to teach henceforth on pain of loss of life and limb" (269). He urged that "safe-conduct on the highways be abolished completely for the Jews" (270). He wrote that "usury should be prohibited to them and that all cash and treasure of silver and gold be taken from them and put aside for safekeeping" (270).
It is intriguing that post WWII, this part of Luther's writings and attitude is seldom quoted or acknowledged, even though it sits deeply behind the collaboration of the German Church with the agenda of the Third Reich. Luther's works and beliefs entered into the collective psyche of the entire German-speaking world. In Mein Kampf, Hitler extolled Martin Luther as one of the greatest reformers, with reference to Luther's vitriolic condemnation of the Jewish race. The Nazi plan to create a German Reich Church laid its basis on the "Spirit of Dr. Martin Luther" (Hitler 2007, 97) . It was not a coincidence that the first physical violence against the Jews came on November 9 and 10, 1938, the birthday of Martin Luther. On Kristallnacht, Jews were murdered, property was destroyed and vandalized, and synagogues were ransacked, just as Luther had proposed in 1543 (Goldhagen 1997, 49) .
The fundamental problem is not to explain why ordinary Germans killed Jews when the opportunity was given. The fundamental problem is to explain why ordinary people, within the mainstream of Western, Christian, and Enlightenment traditions willingly collaborated in one of the most extreme genocides in human history. It is important to note that although the Jews were the primary target of the hatred and murder fomented by the Nazis, thousands of others were also executed: Poles, Romani, homosexuals, individuals with intellectual and physical disabilities, as well as those suffering from mental illness. It is also significant that approximately 77,000 German citizens were executed solely because they resisted the policies of the Nazis (Dulles 2000, 81) . Adolf Eichmann did not need to be a person driven by personal hatred to mesh seamlessly into this much wider context, and his actions, although brutal, were more easily normalized by the weight of cultural practice surrounding his functions.
The second part of Eichmann's defense by which he distanced himself from personal responsibility for the deaths and suffering he orchestrated, was through his faithfulness and loyalty to the government of his day; Eichmann's part in the genocide of the Jewish people was a function of dutiful service. He asserted at his trial that his indictment for murder was wrong. "With the killing of Jews I had nothing to do. I never killed a Jew, or a non-Jew, for that matter -I never killed any human being" (Arendt 1963 (Arendt /2006 . "Eichmann's guilt," Arendt wrote, "is not equivalent to those Nazi officers who boasted about 'occasional disobediences'" (22). Disobeying orders was not an option for Eichmann. He could only be accused, he argued, of aiding and abetting his government's policy (22). He acknowledged the Nazi policy to exterminate the Jews to be one of the greatest crimes in the history of humanity, but he was not responsible for the policy. In his estimation, he had committed no crime. He said he felt guilty before God but not before the law. Eichmann's demeanor at his trial was that of a man who demonstrated neither guilt for his actions nor hatred for those trying him. He was obeying the law, which was his duty and moral obligation (135). It is in this context that Arendt proffers the concept of the banality of evil: by performing the ritual of doing his duty, Eichmann became an unreflective automaton; his evil was in his mindlessness.
Coline Covington, in her paper "Hannah Arendt, Evil and the Eradication of Thought," argues that Arendt's understanding of Eichmann's mindset is enormously important in understanding how this evil was perpetrated. Eichmann, as a man abrogating his capacity for thought and self-reflection, is contrasted with a person who perpetrates evil out of selfish willfulness or because of mental illness (Covington 2017, 22) . Covington and Arendt agree that in divesting himself of the responsibility for independent thought Eichmann distanced himself from any reflection on his personal culpability in atrocities. He had handed that capacity and that responsibility over to the state.
For Immanuel Kant, another influential German thinker, hiding behind this kind of distortion means that a person elects to remain a perpetual minor. Kant had a massive influence on German (and Western) philosophy, so his perspectives would also have been available to any person educated in a German context, and Eichmann would have been aware of this alternative perspective. The Kantian challenge to Eichmann would have been, "Is obedience to the state really a categorical imperative? Are you not in precisely the kind of situation that demonstrates beyond doubt that it is not?" Kant would have argued that this was not moral courage, but cowardice. For Kant, a man does evil when he consciously subordinates the moral law to the interests of self-love; this evil is radical because it corrupts the basis of moral law, its autonomy and sovereignty. If one remains even somewhat close to Kant's rationale, radical evil must assume the subject's recognition of moral law and his conscious, deliberate intention to violate it (Kant 2008, 15-39) .
Immanuel Kant's ethical system can be considered to be deontological; it is about obligation and duty. In Kant's moral theory, certain actions are prescribed (or forbidden) as matters of duty, regardless of the consequences of the action (or inaction). These duties are based on the categorical imperative, a rule that is used to judge maxims, or plans of actions, and is probably the best-known aspect of his moral thought. "For Kant, evil is primarily a characteristic of the maxims we adopt. Consequently, evil has its source in the human will (willkür), not in our natural inclinations or our reason" (Bernstein 2002, 23 ). Kant's system on its whole is based on teleology (the ultimate goal of the kingdom of ends); his recommendations for individual morality are not concerned with specific consequences.
Kant would describe Eichmann's choice as evil because it is a willful choice that deliberately conceals itself and conceals his own responsibility in the process. This Kant describes as "radical evil" (2008, 70) . In other words, the Arendtian "banality" is, for Kant, naive, cowardly, and unquestioning acceptance for Eichmann's own convenience of a maxim that is quite blatantly not a categorical imperative. It is not an absence of thinking as Arendt and Covington argue but a contrived distortion of thinking. In this construct, radical evil is sanctimonious: it believes in its own righteousness; its deeds are just; and, regardless of the consequences to others, its works are good. The agent is thereby self-defined as not only innocent but also virtuous.
Unlike Kant, Arendt does not think that radical evil has anything to do with the vice of selfishness. Nor does she agree with Kant that radical evil has something to do with humanly comprehensible motives. It is not, for her, about the logical process of treating human beings as a means to an end and thereby denying their intrinsic humanity. For Arendt, the horror of the concentration and death camps can never be fully comprehended by the imagination because it stands outside of life and death (Arendt 1968, 748) . She wrote:
After the murder of the moral person and the annihilation of the judicial person, the destruction of individuality is always successful… For to deny individuality is to deny spontaneity, man's power to begin something new out of his own resources, something that cannot be explained on the basis of reactions to the environment and events. (455) Arendt was arguing that the more Eichmann could show that he had surrendered all personal feelings and self-interest to the objectivity of the governing body, the more he could claim that he was morally without culpability. It is this conviction that rendered Eichmann at once both morally certain and self-justified and, at the same time, indifferent to the suffering and deaths his actions had facilitated. This fundamental deception allows evil to be radical in the sense of willfully corrupting the choice of the moral foundation for our actions while concealing the choice. The concealment cannot happen without there first being a subscription to a lie. Kant eschewed lying because lying to others influences our self-knowledge and interferes with our sense of self. For Kant "…a lie is the making of an untruthful statement with the intention that it is believed to be true" (1996, 206) . Kant argued that evil came into the world, not through the first murder but rather through the first lie (210-211). It is this which also makes Eichmann's evil so chilling. In Eichmann, the pain resided somewhere else, in the Third Reich, the people who had made the decision to exterminate, in the victims, but not in himself. He had switched himself to a moral formula that avowed, come what may, everything he did for his employers and his career advancement was morally acceptable. He perpetuated this distance and disownment by means of a lie that distorted his sense of self and allowed him to perform the most cold-blooded atrocities with no sense of culpability.
In vivid contrast to Eichmann, my patient had committed evil that she did not disown, and it was this awareness, this capacity to reflect and think about what had been done that allowed her to take responsibility for her actions and processes and seek help in accepting that reality and living with its consequences. But it was also what crippled her, in marked contrast to Eichmann's moral ease. Eichmann could not recover because he never perceived that he had anything to recover from. His chosen alienation from the pain of others prevented him from experiencing the discomfort necessary to generate an impetus toward the process of healing. His inability to encounter the pain of others necessitated his own continuing alienation, both from his own reality and from intercourse with others. His last days were spent alone in an Israeli prison cell, and he was subsequently hanged in 1962 at age fifty-six.
My African patient who first piqued my interest in this subject by her comment that "under Idi Amin, there was no crime," was referred to me by her university mentor because it was perceived that she needed professional help in adjusting to the cultural differences she was experiencing as a Ugandan who had immigrated to the United Kingdom. She came to the United Kingdom specifically so she could gain an education. She saw education as a way of securing her future. For ease of reading I have called my patient Alleesha.
Alleesha had survived the reign of Idi Amin and the actions of her abusive parents by subterfuge, by theft, by prostitution, and by infanticide; she had murdered her own infant child because the child was an impediment to her escape from Uganda. She brought into the analysis the horror of the depths of her story. She carried a fear of me "getting rid of" her as she had got rid of her baby. I adhered to the imperative not to abandon her to the forces of destruction she still carried with her, nor to reenact the infanticide by referring her on because her world was too difficult, too horrible, too frightening. The idea of me "getting rid of" the patient captures the sheer brutality of what she had been through and might have been reproduced in the analytical relationship. This woman had committed acts that she considered evil, and she had come for psychological help because she was struggling to cope with what she was remembering. In her desperation to survive in the chaotic, violent, and terrifying world of her parents and the Idi Amin Dada regime, she had transgressed and crossed over many internal boundaries; she had done what she thought could never be forgiven.
Given my patient's traumatic life experience I realized that for her to come and seek help indicated a seed of ethical integrity that had not been extinguished through her suffering. She wanted to address and recoup that which she had lost. She wanted to be freed, not only from the trauma of what had happened to her, but also from the guilt of what she had done to others in order to survive. Healing and wholeness could only occur for my patient if she was able to confront and address the pain intrinsic to her actions. Jung writes in his Red Book: "Man must recognize his complicity in the act of evil" (Jung 2009, 291) .
The analysis provided a holding environment in which my patient could feel both safe enough and cared about enough to face her demons. It was in the process of coming to Idi Amin Dada understand and believe that the therapeutic container was there for her benefit, that she was able to access previously unknown resources. This holding enabled her to encounter and disseminate the processes that had taken her to the places of horror that still haunted her daily existence, to acknowledge her responsibility in these actions, and have compassion for herself in the sufferings and desperation that had generated her actions.
Clinical Material
The history of my patient was quite complex, especially to my Western ears. Alleesha's mother was just twelve years old when she was married to Alleesha's father. By the time her mother reached fifteen she had two children, Alleesha and her older sister. Her father then took a second wife, an older woman and a teacher. Alleesha's mother found this situation intolerable and returned to her parents but without the children, leaving them, as was the custom, with their father. Alleesha was not allowed to meet her mother until she was fifteen years old. Her father married nine wives in total by whom he fathered twenty children. He also had sexual relations with Alleesha from when she was of a very young age.
Alleesha suffered from a variety of medical conditions. She contracted syphilis from her mother at birth, and she had also been infected and treated for syphilis on two other occasions and was living with HIV. She earned some of her income from prostitution, which she referred to as "entertaining the gentlemen," but she now used protection in the form of condoms. Alleesha disclosed her involvement in petty criminal schemes relating to the buying and selling of goods, and the buying and selling of herself through prostitution, which she hated.
She said she was concerned that I might worry that she would pass on to me an infection, just as her mother had passed on infection to her in the womb. She was concerned that she would make me physically ill, and I would have to seek help as she was doing. I interpreted this as an anxiety that she would infect me with her mind whereupon I, too, would be ill and infectious and in need of treatment. When I offered this interpretation to my patient she accepted it with relief.
The "mother" who brought her up referred to herself as an empty tree. She had nothing to give emotionally, but taught Alleesha the value of work and education. The image of the empty tree-"the empty mother" growing in the garden of her childhood-was a very frightening image.
I initially had the sense that my patient's criminality could not be discerned through our traditional Western sense of right and wrong; however, this thought was subsequently demonstrated to be incorrect. I was struck by how this thought had initially interfered with my own moral thinking about Alleesha and her morality. As a child needs a parent to teach an ethical sensibility, Alleesha needed moral guidance from me to help her reestablish her own sense of morality. Because of my early reluctance to reflect my own moral values on Alleesha's world, she was left rootless. She needed a solid point, a foundation on which to rebuild her sense of self. She instinctively knew she had to confront the evil in herself to find well-being and peace.
It became evident at an early stage of the work that my patient had begun to get in touch with a deep internal ethic, activated by a sense that she had betrayed her own self-value and self-worth by having sold herself. This appeared to be a parallel process to having been rejected by her mother and significant others in her life. A moral center is intrinsically tied to a sense of belonging. When there is no parent, the subject is an orphan, and an orphan belongs to nobody. Without that sense of belonging there is no center around which the self can revolve. The recovery of wholeness depends on a recovery of that sense of center, that sense of belonging, of rootedness in community which has mores and boundaries, not arbitrarily and whimsically manufactured for the benefit of tyranny, as with Idi Amin's regime, but stable and consistent and for the benefit of all.
Alleesha had suffered trauma in a nation that was suffering trauma. She had learned to adapt to each moment at the cost of her personal center. Her self had been sublimated to the survival demands placed upon her, and the problematic cultural shift that her university had discerned was not in the shift from African to British culture, but the nascent awareness of her sublimated center that was struggling to reemerge and was now awakening within the stability and security of her analysis.
Alleesha drew my attention to a powerful image that was initially introduced much like an afterthought or throwaway line. She complained that she could not see the stars in the night sky, not because of her glaucoma or any disorder in her eyes, but that it had been a difficulty for as long as she could remember. When she looked at the night sky all she saw was blackness. I was reminded of Edgar Allen Poe's famous lonely and tortured midnight thinker who stared into the darkness and found nothing, only his own voice returning to him in the form of an echo from the darkness, nothing except what his imagination allowed.
This unusual phenomenon in my patient alerted me to the possible presence of a terrifying internal dynamic, of being petrified in a morass of somatic and psychic disturbances. In this paralyzed state, when she looked into the night sky there were no stars, only darkness; "…only this, and nothing more" (Poe 1991, 1) . I understood this phenomenon of not being able to see the stars in the night sky as a multifaceted and complicated enactment. I sensed that it might be linked to imagination and, as a consequence, to meaning, to the capacity to imagine something different.
She was a person brought up in an inhospitable place, a desert, with a mother who had no love to give and a father who was sexually and physically abusive. The words "child" and "adult," "mother" and "father," "husband" and "wife," "love" and "hate," "night" and "day," "life" and "death"-these became words without meaning. Without meaning attached, words can indicate anything and therefore have no content, or have no content and therefore can mean anything: no sense, no boundaries. She began to allow me as her analyst to become her landmark: a lighthouse, an oasis, a bridge, a point of orientation in an otherwise desolate and dark background. She had no internal stable points of reference, no indication of which way to travel, to safety or to shipwreck. She could not see the stars at night because the stars are for navigation in the night, the means of knowing south from north; they are points of reference in blackness. Her orientation had been obliterated by the blackness of her past. It seems that she could not see the stars at night because they represented an emerging perspective about her previous behavior that she could not yet see or understand.
Alleesha's inability to see the stars in the night sky was a result of deprivation and trauma. When a person has no stable reference point, the only means of survival is to live in the eternal intensity of a constant state of alertness, a survival mode of living; no opportunity exists for the space to look up and contemplate the cosmos in which they live and reflect on and find meaning in their existence.
Alleesha had no sense that authority could be protective and beneficial. I had no automatic attributed authority simply because I was her analyst. I had to earn my patient's respect through the provision of a safe and just environment before she allowed me to have any authority in the darkness of her cosmos. This is not surprising because she had lived much of her life in a corrupt and violent atmosphere. Alleesha had no images of a good containing parent.
I have come to realize that Alleesha's experience of trauma sits within the context of the zeitgeist of the country of Uganda, a country whose collective trauma has left an indelible mark on the group consciousness. It is interesting that analysis has tended to focus on the trauma suffered by the individual, but in so doing passes over the significance of collective trauma (Shay 1995, xxii) . And yet the collective trauma that befell Uganda was inflicted on every person and is the nidus of both individual and cultural trauma.
Coming for her analytical sessions created a space where Alleesha could speak about and become conscious of the impact of the unthinkable horrors she had experienced. She spoke about her brother who had been murdered by the rebels. He had been dead for a week when she found him. My patient also spoke about witnessing a man being stripped naked and beaten to death for practicing black magic. She said that in Uganda if you were a homosexual you were stripped naked, your genitals were violently removed, and you were beaten to death. I felt quite overwhelmed at times by the narrations of execution, degradation, and torture, but also with the lack of affect in the telling. I suggested that she wanted a place where these horrors and their impact could be brought in, looked at, thought about.
At the beginning of the seventh month Alleesha began to lie on the couch. The movement on to the couch allowed my patient the space for reflection. Her eyes were no longer fixed on me, watching my every move, trying to penetrate into my innermost being, trying to discover my motivations, my thinking, my capacity to hold her and her violence. About twelve months into the analysis, there was a noticeable difference in Alleesha's mannerisms. On the couch she seemed more relaxed. It seemed that the movement from the chair to the couch allowed for a more contemplative and thinking aspect to emerge.
It was around this time that Alleesha began to dream. She had only experienced one dream in the previous six months, a dream of being eaten alive by ants. It had occurred within the first six months of analysis, and she had been terrified of the feelings aroused by the content of the dream. I interpreted this dream as her terror of being eaten alive from the inside out. She responded to my interpretation with a great deal of emotion: "I don't like this dream. I need 'wema' or I die." I have discovered in my work with Alleesha that wema has many facets: it is the security of a mother's arms around you; it is also safety; it is nourishment; it is ethics and boundaries. Alleesha was beginning to encounter her unconscious, so long submerged, and this encounter was terrifying. The self she had constructed was being encountered as no longer sustainable, breaking down in the face of forces that could not be named or numbered.
The fifteenth month of analysis began with a sense of urgency. My patient arrived in a disturbed state and after almost throwing herself onto the couch, exclaimed: "I have much fear in me; the ghosts they haunt me." She continued: "This therapy has helped me know who I am but now I am haunted by the things I have done in my life." She then blurted out with a sense of relief and terror that when she was pregnant with her first child she was sent away from home to live with her aunt. The pregnancy was the result of intercourse with a man from her own clan, and in Uganda, this is a curse. The man had given her Panadol, an over-the-counter painkiller, and assured her that this would stop her from becoming pregnant.
Alleesha gave birth to a little girl whom she loved. Her aunt, however, kept telling her that she was cursed because of the baby. Alleesha also wanted to go to university, and this baby girl was an impediment to her future career plans. Terrified of what would happen if she had no education and was cursed, she killed her baby. She said the baby had to die to free her from the curse and so she could have an education and not die in poverty. In Uganda, she said, a baby's life means nothing; many babies die every day of poverty and disease so what is the loss of one more small life.
I was shocked at this revelation of the killing of her infant daughter. To me, it seemed that this was not caused by a post-partum psychosis but rather was the direct result of the terror of witchcraft, of being cursed, and of the feeling of hopelessness. In Uganda during Idi Amin's reign of terror, a baby's life was worth nothing, and although Alleesha did not have to give an account to any external authority for this murder, she was held to account by her own inner world. It was Alleesha who convicted herself of the crime of murder, and she was the judge, the jury, and the executioner. Speaking of the murder of her baby made her feel haunted. She said she could not sleep because the ghosts were unrelenting; they would bang on the walls and knock things from her dressing table. They would not let her sleep. The ghost of the baby cried and cried.
The ghosts seemed to be the spirits of her baby daughter, her brother who was shot, and her surrogate mother. This surrogate mother would have helped her and would not have allowed her to kill her baby.
I came to realize that for Alleesha the ghosts were not dead; they were buried alive in a crypt, along with the guilty and shameful secrets she carried. The crypt protected the secrets' exposure but stifled Alleesha's capacity to acknowledge the loss she had sustained. For Alleesha these ghosts were very real, and she was terrified of them, of why they returned from the dead, why they haunted her, and why they created such havoc.
At this time, I was overcome by a feeling of hopelessness. I think I felt Alleesha's hopelessness and her despair. How does one do battle with ghosts? As I sat with this feeling I remembered that in Memories, Dreams, Reflections Jung speaks of his own ghostly visitations:
The whole house was filled as if there were a crowd present, crammed full of spirits. They were packed deep right up to the door, and the air was so thick it was scarcely possible to breathe. As for myself, I was all aquiver with the question: "For God's sake, what in the world is this?" Then they cried out in chorus: "We have come back from Jerusalem, where we found not what we sought." (1963, (215) (216) Jung goes on to say that this was the beginning of his work on the Septem Sermones or the Seven Sermons to the Dead. It was only when he took up his pen to write that the ghostly assembly evaporated. Like Jung, Alleesha needed to find out what the ghosts wanted.
Alleesha said that the ghost of her baby cried loudly; this surprised her because she did not cry before Alleesha killed her. She said that the girl lay in her arms and looked at her with her eyes opened wide and cried out: "Free me! Free me!" These night-time visitations had devastating results. Alleesha looked exhausted and unwell; she developed respiratory problems, which I interpreted as her terror that her baby wanted to suffocate her as she had smothered her baby. Alleesha responded with a quote from the bible: "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." She was petrified that she would die in the night and so could not risk closing her eyes in case she fell asleep. Although she was not in prison in her external world, Alleesha had created her own internal prison. She was on an imagined death row caught in the eye of a disturbing storm.
I suggested that perhaps she needed to allow the baby and the other ghosts to speak and the baby's name to be spoken so that the child was not thrown into the garbage like so many other babies in Uganda. Alleesha agreed and said that she had called her baby Allat after one of the daughters of the prophet Muhammad. It was after uttering the name of the baby during analysis that the ghostly visitations, the banging and knocking of things from her dressing table, ceased. But they had not disappeared or gone underground into the crypt; they remained inside Alleesha and made their presence known through disturbing feelings and thoughts inside her head. Alleesha did not know what to do with what she thought, felt, saw, imagined, and dreamed.
I found the revelation of murder and the eruption of the ghostly visitations quite difficult to contain. I felt exhausted during the sessions and fearful of having an asthmatic attack. Her anxiety and terror were palpable; they filled the room and I was affected by them. I had a feeling of being taken over and invaded. The revelations had the power of a violent volcanic eruption, driven by the interaction of molten hot memories and feelings that had been repressed and covered over by the desperate need to survive. There was relief in Alleesha's voice as she disclosed the murder and her terror that I might not be able to cope with the revelation. Would I ask her to leave? The stark and desolate image of hellfire and prison erupted into the room with as much horror as discovering a rotting corpse in a lake in which you were swimming.
I experienced many somatic disturbances in my work with Alleesha, and this indicated the profound impact that Alleesha had on me and our work together. On one occasion, Alleesha prayed for me to become ill but it backfired; she became ill. Again, in the second year of our working together, she had not wanted to leave at the end of a session. Her departing words were spoken with some venom: "I pray to God that he makes you sick." Alleesha then missed the next two sessions due to a severe bout of gastroenteritis, and when she came for the next session she looked quite unwell. She spoke with some discomfort: "I tell you now as confession… I pray to God for you to be sick, and then when I leave, I leave the sign of black magic in your garden… I leave little pile of stones with forked twig so that sickness will come to you… I built an altar of darkness in your garden." She told me that she became anxious that I might become ill and die and so she had come down in the early hours of the morning to remove the offending altar.
On yet another occasion Alleesha did not want to leave at the end of her session and demanded that I give her more time. I calmly refused to comply because it seemed important that boundaries were maintained with this patient who had rarely, if ever, experienced stable boundaries. I felt it important my patient's agenda did not become my agenda. I wasn't sure if she wanted more time or wanted to test the boundaries. I also considered whether she thought I might be frightened of her and her magic. My patient leaned forward in the chair, narrowed her eyes, and said: "I pray to God that he makes you sick." I was taken aback, not by the cursing itself but by the venom of the curse. I was quite struck by its primordial power. I felt threatened but kept my mind focused on my breathing and my feet firmly planted on the floor. I thought about what it meant to be cursed for Alleesha, because that is what she felt: cursed by humanity and by God. This thinking helped ground me in the here and now, and I realized and proposed to Alleesha that she felt cursed. She agreed. In traditional societies and cultures such as she described, the physical and spiritual worlds frequently intersect. Black magic was an underlying reality for Alleesha and in the culture of her origin, and her cursing of me emanated out of this culture.
Alleesha came to the next session very concerned and was surprised that I was not ill. However, over the next few weeks she cursed me a number of times. She always returned somewhat astonished, but relieved, that I was fit and well. It was my capacity to survive the bad "juju" in the form of curses that enabled my patient to develop trust and acceptance of my authority as someone who could endure the evil she carried and projected. This led to a dramatic shift in the analysis.
During a planned visit to Uganda, Alleesha was deeply affected by the sight of a two-day-old infant with sores on her skin, lying naked on an old sack on top of a plastic garbage bag. What impacted Alleesha was that in a room full of women no one picked up the baby. The baby had been left to die alone. She said, "When I see baby on floor with sores I say this is me inside… but baby will die if no one cares for her." I responded, "Babies need to be picked up and held close." This derivative statement enabled Alleesha to see her own precarious state and to access her absolute terror of abandonment and death. She was able to see herself in the plight of this tiny infant, left in pain, isolated on a garbage bag on the floor.
At this point in the treatment Alleesha had a dream. She came to the session and said, "I worked very hard yesterday and I sleep deeply and I have dream of the health center in Uganda. In my dream there is only the framework but then it comes to life before my eyes. It is like what the prophet Ezekiel speaks of. It is the Valley of Dry Bones from Bible. God speaks to Ezekiel; he says: 'Do you believe these bones can live again?' Ezekiel does not believe-but God speaks and before his eyes the bones come together, the skin is put on the bones and God breathes his breath into them and gives them life and they become a great nation and this is like health center -there is only a small brick wall but now it has a roof and the walls are nearly complete and there are x-ray machines, medicines and beds and now training has begun for nurses; the health center has come to life." She continued with some feeling: "I was like the Valley of Dry Bones and I have no hope, but God does not despise me-he sends me to you for help-and you help me-he sends me to the charity and they help me…I am like little baby in plastic bag…I am worthless, who sells herself for food but now I no sell myself."
This was the first time Alleesha had been able not only to have a dream but also to make a link between her internal and external worlds. From here on, although Alleesha struggled with her reliance on black magic and cursing and her feelings of omnipotence and helplessness, her relationship with me, forged in the analysis, was having an effect on her internal world. Alleesha found some redemption for herself. She eventually returned to Uganda to work in an orphanage caring for babies and children, which seemed to give her a purpose and sense of identity. She has had no further ghostly visitations or psychic disturbances.
Alleesha survived Idi Amin's reign of terror through subterfuge, prostitution, and infanticide; she paid an enormous price, a price that would haunt her for the rest of her life. Yet, she was able, with another, to contemplate and speak of her experiences and, in the speaking, find a pathway through the morass to what she felt was redemption.
The Cost of Living in an Oppressive Regime I began this paper with a discussion emanating from a number of sources, that under repressive totalitarian regimes there is no crime. I was intrigued with this idea because under such totalitarian states the environment itself can actively promote criminal acts. Repressive totalitarian regimes, such as those referenced in this paper, are states founded on criminality. Moral categories are skewed; public life is destroyed; and this destruction invades and demolishes every aspect of human intimacy and relationship. Under such conditions there are no stable contexts or reference points by which a person or community may develop a reliable moral compass. There can be no crime in such environments because there is no law governing behavior. The only thing that is criminal is offending the regime, and the regime may alter the parameters of what constitutes an offense at any time.
Evil becomes a functional means of government and thereby shifts the locus of evil's presence from the individual to the state. This promotes the illusion that the responsibility for evil is deflected away from the individual who participates in the evil and the locus of responsibility is shifted to the state. Therefore, there is no action that is identified as crime by those who have the power to define what constitutes crime. The illusion that there is no crime remains, but the experienced reality is that life is lived in an environment that actively sponsors crime, where evil acts are a means of government. This facilitates a confusion of morality, of conscience, and of identity in which the individual's sense of right and wrong is perpetually disorientated. Although there were no charges ever laid against Alleesha, and no social consequences for her actions, in an ironic twist, this exacerbated the sense of guilt that she experienced. Because there was no external consequence, the full weight of disapprobation was experienced internally and there was no closure, so the felt guilt was prolonged and intensified in the patient's psyche. Acts that can seem acceptable in this environment can come back to haunt the actor when another environment exposes the illusion.
Eichmann enjoyed his position of authority within the Third Reich; he would scream at his victims, threatening that he would send them to concentration camps. He wore the SS Death Emblem proudly and titled himself as Czar of the Jews. To say that Eichmann was thoughtless is not accurate. He displayed no remorse at his trial but rather play-acted the helpless bureaucrat who was only doing his duty as a good citizen. Nevertheless, self-deception takes effort, and this may well be what lay behind the alcoholism of Adolf Eichmann, the orchestrator of the "final solution" (Cesarani 2005, 321) . Norman Ohler argues that there is a specific connection between the high instance of substance abuse in the Third Reich and the need for such self-deception. Not only was alcoholism rife, but also the use of Pervitin (a crystal methamphetamine) by the Nazis was widespread from 1937, utilized to create feelings of euphoria, omnipotence, and invincibility (Ohler 2016, 226) .
Eichmann can be seen as but one (albeit very conspicuous) example of the kind of statesponsored moral disorientation that, in a different context, disoriented Alleesha. One of the differences between Alleesha and Eichmann is that Alleesha, removed from that toxic context, was increasingly disabled by an internal moral conflict until she submitted to a sustained and safe analysis. Unlike Eichmann, Alleesha was eventually able to confront her demons and attempt a third phase of her life with her internal and external worlds beginning to approach some level of integration.
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